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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL L. PICKENS, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
Case No. 89-697-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This appeal arises from Defendant's conviction for Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2A-3(2)(d) which permits appeals from circuit courts. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly 
found sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES OR RULES 
The only statute involved in this appeal is Section 41-
6-44, Utah State Code Anno., as adopted by Ordinance No. 83-14, 
City of Park city, Utah, which provides: 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person has 
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 5, 1989, Defendant was charged with Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol and Driving on a Suspended License, both 
Class B Misdemeanors. (R. 3, 4). On May 5, 1989, the Defendant 
filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress the blood test 
results. (R. 5, 11). Hearings on these Motions were held on May 
24, 1989 in the Circuit Court in and for Park City, Summit 
County, the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, presiding (Circuit Court 
Docket found in record after page 47). Both Motions were 
eventually denied by Judge Jones. 
A bench trial was heard on July 5, 1989. At the conclusion 
of the evidence, the trial court took the case under advisement. 
(Circuit Court Docket found in records after page 47). 
On August 16, 1989, the Court found the Defendant guilty of 
the offense of During Under the Influence of Alcohol. On 
November 20, 1989, the defendant was sentenced which sentenced is 
stayed pending this appeal. (Circuit Court Docket found in 
record after page 47). 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 16, 1989 and an 
Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on December 6, 1989. (R. 31, 
45) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 29, 1989, at approximately 9:45 p.m. on Highway 
224 in Park City, Utah, the Defendant drove his Nissan pick-up 
truck into the rear of a Park City Municipal Corporation road 
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grader. (R. 6,7 & 17). At the time of the accident the road 
grader was traveling at approximately 15 miles per hour to the 
Ridgeview Subdivision to remove snow. (R. 6, 7). The accident 
occurred when the Nissan pick-up driven by the Defendant passed a 
Park City Municipal Corporation loader and rammed into the rear 
of the road grader which was approximately four car lengths to 
100 yards in front of the loader. (R. 18, 21 22). The grader 
had its rear lights activated and Highway 224 was bare of snow 
when the accident occurred. (R. 6, 18) . 
After the accident occurred the driver of the grader, LaMar 
Simpson, went to Defendant's vehicle where he determined 
Defendant was bleeding from the nose and had injured his leg. 
(R. 9, 18). Mr. Simpson advised the investigating Officer, 
Robert Caffery, that he detected alcohol and requested that a 
blood alcohol sample be drawn from Defendant for detection of 
alcohol. (R. 9). 
Officer Caffery also detected the odor of alcohol coming 
from inside the pick-up truck where the Defendant was pinned. 
(R. 28, 29). 
The Defendant was removed from his vehicle and taken to the 
Holy Cross Clinic in Park City, Utah. (R. 29). At the Holy 
Cross Hospital, Officer Caffery advised Defendant that he was 
investigating a DUI and asked if he would voluntarily consent to 
have his blood drawn. (R. 30). After speaking with his 
attorney, Loni DeLand, the defendant agreed to submit to a blood 
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test. (R. 32). The blood was drawn by Margie Offert at the 
Holy Cross Clinic and placed in a blood collection kit. (R. 32). 
Mr. Caffery deposited the blood collection kit in evidence at the 
Park City Police Department on January 30, 1990. Officer Mary 
Ford of the Park City Police Department took the sealed blood 
collection kit to the Utah State Health Lab on January 30, 1990. 
(R. 46, 47). Barbara Jepson from the State Health Lab did not 
testify based on a stipulation of defense counsel that her 
toxicology report would be admitted into evidence subject to 
relevance, materiality and foundation. (R« 49, 50). Although 
counsel for both parties argued whether the foundation 
requirements were met for introduction of Exhibit No. 3, the 
Court on two separate occasions indicated the toxicology report 
would be received. (R. 49, 53). The toxicology report showed a 
.17 alcohol blood reading. (R. 54). 
Officer Caffery testified that Defendant admitted he had 
been drinking alcohol and the officer was of the opinion the 
Defendant was intoxicated. (R. 29, 34). No field sobriety tests 
were performed due to the extent of the injuries sustained by the 
Defendant. (R. 34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecution has proven each element of the crime of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol by showing both: (1) the 
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater, and (2) 
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a 
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degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving his vehicle 
even without considering the blood test. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A CONVICTION FOR DUI 
To convict the Defendant of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol, it is required that the prosecution prove the following 
elements: 
1. That on or about the 29th day of January, 1989, the 
Defendant, Michael L. Pickens, was driving a motor vehicle. 
2. That while so driving the motor vehicle, the defendant 
either: 
(a) Was under the influence of alcohol to a degree 
which rendered said defendant incapable of driving 
said vehicle; OR 
(b) The defendant had a blood alcohol content 
of .08% or greater; 
3. That such alleged acts occurred in Park City, Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
There is no dispute that elements number 1 and 3 have been 
proven by the prosecution. Accordingly, the issue in this case 
is whether the Defendant was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving 
his vehicle or whether the Defendant had a blood alcohol content 
of .08 percent or greater. 
It is submitted that with the docket entry reflecting that 
the court admitted the blood kit and sealed container and the 
court transcript reflecting such admission on two separate 
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occasions is sufficient evidence to show that element 2(b) above 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 
However, even if this court does not find that the .17 blood 
alcohol test was received into evidence, there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt without considering the blood test result. 
Defendant has cited in his Memorandum State v. Goodman, 91 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, September 9, 1988, to establish the standard of 
review in an appeal from a bench trial. The standard of review 
in criminal cases was also set forth in the case of In Interest 
of I., R.L.. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) which also involved a 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol case which was tried 
before the trial judge as the trier fact. Citing State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45, the Court stated: 
We review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted (citations omitted)....This Court still has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the 
defendant must cover the gap between the presumption of 
innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its 
duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not 
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, 
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
739 P.2d at 1129. 
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The I.R.L. case is closely analogous to the case at bar 
inasmuch as the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence 
to sustain a conviction for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. In the I.. R.L. case, the Utah Court of Appeals 
suppressed the blood test on the basis there was no "actual 
consent" to the blood test that was performed prior to the 
defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the Court had to determine if 
the following facts were sufficient to sustain the defendant's 
conviction without considering the blood test: (1) A serious 
head-on collision with testimony the defendant had been driving 
in the wrong way of traffic on a blind curve; (2) The strong 
alcoholic odor at the scene of the accident and later at the 
hospital; (3) Voluntary, unsolicited statements from the 
defendant such as "I am drunk. I am guilty. They should take me 
out and shoot me."; (4) At times the defendant talking 
incoherently in a rambling manner and "screamed and hollered"; 
(5) The opinion of the investigating officer that the 
defendant was under the influence of intoxicants. The defendant, 
as in a case at bar, did not present any evidence at trial. The 
Court, after considering the above factors stated: 
We find from reviewing the evidence that reasonable minds 
could not entertain a reasonable doubt that the appellant 
committed the crime for which he was convicted and that the 
evidentiary fabric need not even be stretched to come to 
this conclusion. We therefore find, even excluding the 
blood test, that there is sufficient evidence to sustain 
appellant's conviction in the juvenile court and that 
the blood test evidence was only cumulative. 739 P.2d at 
1129. 
-7-
Reviewing the evidence in the case at bar, the factors 
establishing guilt are almost identical: (1) The defendant was 
involved in a serious automobile accident with testimony that the 
defendant drove into the back of a Park City road grader which 
was traveling on a highway bare of snow with its rear lights 
activated; (2) Admissions by the defendant that he had been 
drinking alcohol; (3) The odor of an alcoholic beverage as 
testified to by both the driver of the road grader and the 
investigating officer; and (4) Testimony of the investigating 
officer that the defendant was intoxicated. 
Appellant cites Sandy City v, Thorsness, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28, August 18, 1989, as a case where a DUI conviction was 
reversed by this court where the officer's suspicion for the stop 
was based on a driving pattern which was "equally indicative of 
innocent behavior". The Thorsness case is easily distinguished 
from the case at bar. The sole issue in Thorsness was whether 
there was probably cause to stop the vehicle driven by defendant. 
The officer in Thorsness had stopped to assist a motorist at 1:30 
a.m. The defendant drove around the officer's vehicle and 
stopped his car to observe the activity of the officer and the 
car's occupant. The driver then pulled away at a "slow rate of 
speed". Based solely on these factors, the officer activated his 
emergency lights and pulled the defendant to the side of the 
road. Under these facts, the court properly indicated that there 
was no reasonable basis to suspect the defendant of being 
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intoxicated when he stopped his vehicle. Although the 
defendant's conviction was reversed, this Court expressed its 
concern about the dangers posed by those driving while 
intoxicated. The Court stated: 
We are sensitive to the dangers posed in our communities 
by those who drive while intoxicated. See State v. 
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985), and cases cited 
therein. But, even so, these dangers are not properly 
alleviated by permitting traffic stops and arrests on the 
basis of evidence as meager as that offered in this 
case. Our decision should not deter the enforcement of 
drunk driving laws when traffic stops and arrests are 
predicated on at least a reasonable, articulated suspicion 
that an accused is intoxicated. 115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
Appellant also cites State v. Johnson, 287 P. 
909 (Utah 1930). This case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch 
as it dealt with the crime of involuntary manslaughter as it 
existed sixty years ago. One of the issues in the case was 
whether the defendant was operating his vehicle under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The only evidence in this 
regard was testimony that three or four hours after the accident, 
the chief of police called at the defendant's residence and 
detected the odor of liquor on defendant's breath. The defendant 
testified that he had not drank any liquor on the date in 
question and witnesses who saw and conversed with the defendant 
shortly before and after the accident testified he was not under 
the influence of alcohol. The facts of Johnson are 
distinguishable from facts in the instant case where defendant 
was involved in an auto accident consistent with a driver being 
under the influence of alcohol; the odor of alcohol was smelled 
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on the Defendant's breath or from defendant's vehicle while he 
was pinned in his vehicle by two individuals at the scene of the 
accident; the Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol; and the 
investigating officer was of the opinion that Defendant was 
intoxicated. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and arguments, this Court 
should uphold the decision of the trial judge finding the 
Defendant guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June, 1990. 
Terry L. Christiansen 
Park City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Loni F. DeLand, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 132 South 600 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this 7th day of June, 1990. 
Terry L. Christiansen 
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